For decades, category-specific semantic impairment -i.e., better comprehension of items from one semantic category than another -has been the driving force behind many claims about the organisation of conceptual knowledge in the brain. Double dissociations between patients with category-specific disorders are widely interpreted as showing that different conceptual domains are necessarily supported by functionally independent systems. We show that, to the contrary, even strong or classical dissociations can also arise from individual differences in premorbid expertise. We examined two patients with global and progressive semantic degradation who, unusually, had known areas of premorbid expertise. Patient 1, a former automotive worker, showed selective preservation of car knowledge, whereas Patient 2, a former botanist, showed selective preservation of information about plants. In non-expert domains, these patients showed the typical pattern: i.e., an inability to differentiate between highly similar concepts (e.g., rose and daisy), but retention of broader distinctions (e.g., between rose and cat). Parallel distributed processing (PDP) models of semantic cognition show that expertise in a particular domain increases the differentiation of specific-level concepts, such that the semantic distance between these items resembles non-expert basic-level distinctions. We propose that these structural changes interact with global semantic degradation, particularly when expert knowledge is acquired early and when exposure to expert concepts continues during disease progression. Therefore, category-specific semantic impairment can arise from at least two distinct mechanisms: damage to representations that are critical for a particular category (e.g., knowledge of hand shape and action for the category 'tools') and differences in premorbid experience.
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Introduction
A key objective of cognitive neuroscience is to understand the functional and neural organisation of semantic memory, which encompasses the meanings of words, pictures, objects, faces and facts about the world. One dominant view is that our semantic knowledge draws, at least in part, on sensory and motor representations (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Martin, 2007; Pulvermuller, 2005) . According to this theory, the meaning of an item like "hammer" is derived from links between neural assemblies that represent this object's distinctive shape, the "bang" sound that it makes, information about how you hold and use a hammer, linguistic properties of the word "hammer" and so on. In addition, some researchers propose that these sensory and motor features are combined to form amodal semantic representations in anterior temporal lobes (i.e., * Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 0 1904 434368. E-mail addresses: beth.jefferies@york.ac.uk, ej514@york.ac.uk (E. Jefferies).
there is an ATL "hub" which draws on modality-specific "spokes"; Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers, 2007) .
Patients who show category-specific semantic impairmenti.e., differential loss of knowledge for one semantic category over another -are considered to be critical in understanding how the brain represents semantic information because they are thought to provide evidence that different domains of knowledge are differentially reliant on separate brain areas (reviewed in Capitani, Laiacona, Mahon, & Caramazza, 2003) . Double dissociations between patients on the same semantic tests (e.g., patient A's knowledge of animals is much worse than his knowledge of manmade objects, while patient B shows the opposite pattern) are particularly provocative, as they imply that category effects are not merely a consequence of the vulnerability of different tasks or semantic domains to damage (Mahon & Caramazza, 2009; Shallice, 1988) .
Over the last two decades, there have been over 125 published cases of category-specific impairment (Capitani et al., 2003) , including a number of classical or strong double-dissociations, 0028-3932/$ -see front matter © 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.07.024
